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Introduction
As Mario Vargas Llosa has remarked in a recent essay, while Latin America 
is a projection of the Occident, it has also acquired a number of features 
peculiar to itself, which give it a distinctive character of its own: ‘Sí, América 
Latina es una prolongación ultramarina de Occidente, que, desde la colonia, 
ha adquirido perfiles propios, los que, sin emanciparla del tronco común, 
le dan una personalidad diferenciada’.1 Similarly, New Zealand, likewise an 
overseas projection of Western Europe, has also acquired its own distinctive 
personality, in part because of a history of engagement with an indigenous 
non-European culture, as is the case with many Latin American countries 
(in varying degrees).
 In this paper I wish to focus on a so far little-noticed parallel between 
Latin America and New Zealand: the revolutionary changes in land tenure 
that took place in the nineteenth century. In both Latin America and in 
New Zealand these changes had enormous consequences for indigenous 
communities.2 While there have been a number of interesting books which 
compare developments in this area within the related jurisdictions of the 
common law world, there has not been, to my knowledge, any sustained 
discussion of parallels beyond this.3 There is one obvious reason for this. 
New Zealand and the Spanish American republics differ from each other not 
only culturally, historically, and in language, but also because they belong to 
different legal families: countries such as Brazil and Mexico belong to the 
civil law world – in fact they are the two of the largest civil law countries 
in the world. Latin American legal traditions and styles of legal scholarship 
derive from France, Spain and Italy.4 Common lawyers and civilians belong 
to distinct legal civilizations. On the whole, when New Zealand lawyers 
look to overseas parallels to legal developments at home they have tended 
to look within the common law world and not further afield.
 The seventeenth-century political philosopher Thomas Harrington, who 
published his classic work Oceana in England in 1656, is known especially 
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for his attempts to link patterns of land-holding with republican liberty.5 That 
there is some connection between tenure and political liberty and stability 
seems to be borne out by empirical experience, as, for instance, is suggested 
by the contrasting histories of two adjoining Central American countries, 
Costa Rica and Nicaragua. The first, a land of small family farms and rural 
prosperity, rather like a Central American version of New Zealand, also 
stands out in its own region for a long history of democratic stability and 
levels of literacy and health care that are equivalent to the developed world. 
Costa Rica is also blessed with a remarkable public ideology of democratic 
republican nationalism and a strong sense of exceptionalism. While it 
must be admitted that prominent Costa Rican historians are beginning to 
wonder whether their country’s unique brand of political and economic 
exceptionalism, ‘la excepcionalidad de Costa Rica’ might now be under 
threat from the pressures of a globalized international economy, the contrast 
between these two countries remains very marked.6 Nicaragua, for much of 
its history a land of great estates and landless peons, has had an unhappy 
history marked by considerable instability, dictatorship and oppression. 
It remains one of the poorest countries in the western hemisphere. Yet 
ethnically Costa Rica and Nicaragua are very similar (whatever Costa Ricans 
and Nicaraguans themselves may say), both are small Central American 
countries lacking in mineral resources and heavy industry, and both have 
economies based on the export of coffee and other primary products. Many 
observers see differences in patterns of land-ownership as one of the key 
ingredients in understanding the contrasting fates of these two neighbouring 
Latin American republics.7 It seems from this example that patterns of tenure 
and land ownership have significant connections with national well-being in 
a broader sense.
 My paper seeks to pursue these questions by means of a comparative 
discussion of an important aspect of the legal history of land tenure: the legal 
transformation of indigenous tenures in the nineteenth century. In nineteenth-
century New Zealand a substantial effort was made to convert lands held 
on indigenous customary tenures into modern and individualized forms 
of tenure recognizable in modern law. The vehicle for this change, a true 
tenurial revolution, was legislation of the colonial parliament, in particular 
the Native Lands Acts, but also the legislation relating to confiscation 
of land belonging to rebel Maori. The confiscation legislation, as I have 
argued elsewhere, was designed not only to take land from ‘rebels’ but 
also to remodel the tenure of land regranted to those deemed not to be in 
rebellion.8 The effects of this tenurial revolution in New Zealand have been 
dramatic, and transformatory. In New Zealand, however, this transformation 
took place in a society which totally lacked a powerful body of conservative 
opinion – there was no established Church, and no equivalent of a Tory 
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party of landowners and bishops. A powerful, landed Conservative party 
such as those that existed in Colombia or Argentina did not exist. Nor was 
there a powerful class of large landowners and policies were implemented 
to ensure that one did not arise. The land acquired from Maori ended up 
mostly being granted to small settlers for family farms. In New Zealand 
– as in Costa Rica – an ideology stressing the benefits of close settlement 
and the family farm has played an important role in national life and has 
had important impacts on policy. The various ways in which this ideology 
worked its way through into land acquisition and land settlement policy was 
one of the themes of my 2008 book, Buying the Land, Selling the Land.9
 In the nineteenth-century Spanish American republics, newly independent 
from Spain there was, as in New Zealand, a legal assault on indigenous 
lands held on customary tenures. This was accompanied by an attack on the 
extensive land-holdings of the Catholic Church. These lands included those 
belonging to the secular Church of bishoprics and parishes, and the extensive 
land-holdings of the regular orders such as the Dominicans, Franciscans 
and Augustinians – the Bourbon monarchy having already prohibited the 
Society of Jesus and expropriated their properties in the eighteenth century. 
In both the New Zealand and the Latin American case these equivalent 
processes of change were driven by liberal and modernizing elite groups 
within colonial society who had seized political control at the local level, 
and in both cases the process of ‘reform’, if it deserves the name, was 
embarked on by a mixture of motives in which a hope to benefit directly 
from the alienation of indigenous lands and an ideological belief in the 
value of modern tenures in unlocking opportunities for development and 
modernization were uppermost. Or, to put it more crudely, both greed and 
ideology played a role. Greed, alas, is a human constant in this fallen world. 
It is the ideological parallels which are the more interesting, and the more 
susceptible of inquiry by mere mortals. But to pursue matters further it is 
necessary to look more closely at our two parallels.
Tenurial change in nineteenth-century New Zealand
The New Zealand example can be described briefly. In New Zealand it was 
assumed that the indigenous people held title to the entire soil of the country 
– a major difference with Australia, where the opposite assumption prevailed 
– and thus before land could be allocated to settlers from the British Isles, 
the Native title had to be extinguished somehow. Until 1862 this was done 
by what were known pre-emptive purchases or deeds: the Crown simply 
bought land off Maori and then handed it over to the provincial governments 
for allocation. These purchases were often of very large areas, and by this 
means about two-thirds of the customary title was extinguished, including 
virtually the whole South Island, a few inconsequential areas aside, and 
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parts of the North. But Maori still held most of their lands in the densest 
areas of settlement in such areas as the Waikato, Taranaki, Hawke’s Bay 
and the Bay of Plenty.
 In 1862 the first Native Lands Act was passed, which switched from 
pre-emptive purchase to an entirely different approach. Maori title was 
converted to a Crown-granted tenure, held by Maori as named individuals 
(i.e. not by tribes or sub-tribes: iwi and hapu); once so-held it could be 
alienated to private purchasers or the State. Maori alternatively could keep 
such land in their own possession and often did so: they were free to alienate 
it or use it as they chose. Just as with similar schemes in other parts of 
the world, the net effect, however, was rapid alienation. The Native Lands 
Acts also created a new type of land tenure: land that had always been 
held in customary ownership, but now held on a ‘modern’ and English-law 
tenure by named individuals. This category of land, now known as ‘Maori 
freehold land’, remains important in New Zealand, and accounts for about 
12% of the North Island to this day. The principal agency for all this was 
a particular court, the Native Land Court, which heard cases about Maori 
land and issued judgements in rem as to who the true owners were. As the 
Maori Land Court, this Court, New Zealand’s oldest specialist court, is still 
very much a going concern and remains important in the Maori world. The 
main transformations in New Zealand took place from circa 1865-1886: it 
was the 1865 Act which was pivotal, and the Court did not really begin 
dealing which large blocks on an intensive scale until 1866; from then on 
the process of investigation and alienation was very rapid.
Latin American examples: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador 
and Colombia
Turning to Latin America, we come at the outset to an obvious point of 
divergence: in New Zealand there is no parallel to the very lengthy Spanish 
colonial period, which in Mexico (New Spain), can be said to have lasted 
from 1521-1810, three hundred years of a vast and elaborate colonial edifice 
by which the religious, political and educational institutions of the mother 
country were transplanted to the New World. It is often forgotten in the 
Anglophone world that in 1800 the biggest city (by far) in North America 
was Mexico City – as it is today – and that the Universities in Mexico City 
and Lima are about a century older than Harvard. Learned works of theology 
were being published in Lima two hundred years before the American 
Revolution. Spanish territorial claims in the New World were founded not 
on categories familiar to Anglo-American legal historians – discovery, 
conquest, settlement – but rather on an elaborate legal edifice, deriving from 
the Papacy’s claims to universal jurisdiction, based on the papal grants of 
1493 made by Alexander VI to the Crown of Castile, las bulas alejandrinas 
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as they are known, which were embodied and and modified by the Treaty 
of Tordesillas between the kingdoms of Castile and Portugal in 1494.
 The Spanish colonial empire in the New World was a vast edifice with 
marked regional divergences and large gaps between law and policy, on the 
one hand, and colonial realities, on the other, and thus, it is important not 
to over-generalize. It was a patrimonial society of castes, hierarchies and 
competing jurisdictions: a Baroque world in every way, as Octavio Paz so 
eloquently describes it in his celebrated study of the life and times of Sor 
Juana de la Cruz.10 Paz points out that the Spanish empire was seen not as 
collection of colonies belonging to Spain, but rather a group of kingdoms – a 
group that included New Spain – owing allegiance to the Spanish Crown. 
New Spain ‘era otro de los reinos sometidos a la corona, en teoría igual a 
los reinos de Castilla, Aragón, Navarra o León’.11 Some Mexican patriots 
followed this line of reasoning through to argue that, once the Spanish 
monarchy had been overthrown by France during the time of Napoleon, 
the Spanish colonies recovered their independence: there was no Crown to 
unite them.12
 While it is true that the enslavement of indigenous peoples was forbidden 
by imperial law, the empire was also characterized by a wide range of 
oppressive and exploitative devices designed to extract surpluses from 
subject populations. The reality of exploitation and oppression has been 
documented in scores of detailed monographs.13 It would be a mistake, 
however, to imagine that independence from Spain brought an improvement 
in the condition of the indigenous peoples of the continent – indeed, quite 
the reverse seems to have often been the case. With the collapse of the 
colonial empire in the nineteenth century the liberal regimes that assumed 
power in the newly independent republics embarked on a process of making 
formerly protected lands available for private ownership, sale, and use as a 
security – just as liberal colonial politicians did in New Zealand at more 
or less the same time. I will consider here briefly the main developments 
in four countries, Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Colombia. I will 
briefly note also the variety of ways in which the indigenous past fits into 
the political ideologies of these countries.
 Probably the largest, and certainly the best-known of these Latin American 
transformations, was that which took place in Mexico. Even before the 
outbreak of the wars of independence in Mexico, some prominent liberals 
and intellectuals in New Spain had advocated abolishing legal distinctions 
between Indians and other citizens and for the abolition of church and 
communal lands. One source for this may have been the Bourbon monarchy’s 
attack on the Jesuits; the other was probably the religious, agrarian and 
economic legislation of the French revolution and the establishment of a strict 
separation between Church and State in the independent United States. It is 
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clear, however, that Latin America developed a pattern of anti-clericalism of 
the French type, also characteristic of nineteenth-century Spanish politics, 
which was much more extreme and polarizing than anything that developed 
in the United States.
 The main Mexican statutes, which built on on the earlier Ley Lerdo or 
Ley de Desamortizacion 14 of 25 June 1856, which in turn drew on earlier 
repartitional laws in the Mexican states of Michoacan, Zacatecas and 
Guanajuato, were enacted in 1863, 1875, 1883, and 1894. The later statutes 
reflected the views of a group of highly placed technocrats within the Díaz 
regime after 1876, the so-called Científicos, followers of Comptean positivism 
and strong believers in economic liberalism.15 Church lands and communal 
Indian lands were seen as archaic relics of the Spanish colonial empire 
and as obstacles to modernization, and the period of the liberal ‘reforms’ 
associated with the governments of Benito Juárez and Porfirio Díaz saw 
huge losses of Indian lands to private ownership during a period of rapid 
economic expansion.16 In the twentieth century, an ideology of indigenismo 
has flourished in Mexico, which tends to mean an attempt to portray the 
nation as a mestizo country born out of an encounter between Spain and 
the indigenous civilizations that created the Mexico of today. Sometimes 
this goes so far as to see the Mexican revolution against Spain as in fact 
a recovery of independence and as the revival of the ancient Aztec state, 
a perspective which, however appealing in some ways, is perceived by 
Mexican intellectuals, such as Octavio Paz, as nothing short of ridiculous. 
Indigenismo has certainly not always translated into beneficial outcomes for 
Mexico’s actual indigenous peoples of today, such as the Maya communities 
of Chiapas and Yucatan, who are just as poor and marginalized as indigenous 
communities in the United States and Canada.
 Land and land tenure issues continue to be important in Mexican politics 
generally today, as shown by the controversy in Mexico over the ejidos, lands 
held by communities and usually leased to local people by the municipality. 
What has happened in Mexico most recently is a re-emergence of the old 
programmes and old arguments of the Liberals and the Científicos of last 
century, although today the ideological fountainheads for the neoliberal line 
of thinking are the World Bank, FAO, and the Inter-American Development 
Bank. These institutions perceive ‘land titling, the setting up of land registries, 
and market-led reforms as central instruments in the fight against poverty 
in Latin America’.17 However, whether the rural poverty that continues to 
blight the lives of so many Latin American people today, can be alleviated 
by such means remains to be seen. As the popular songs have it, many 
Latin Americans still spend their lives living in those ‘casas de cartón’ or 
‘barracaos de zinco’.18 Although some countries, notably Brazil, have scored 
impressive achievements in the last few decades in lifting people out of 
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poverty, whether neo-liberal ideologies of land tenure have much to do with 
it is an important question. I would add that one result of New Zealand’s 
own land tenure policies was that by the 1920s and 1930s a lot of Maori 
people were living in rural squalor in cardboard houses and tin shacks, or 
their equivalent, as well: it took the combined effects of the welfare state 
and the post-war economic boom to improve matters significantly.
 Guatemala, to take another example, achieved independence from 
Spain in 1821. More polarized than Mexico, the country was and still is 
characterized by sharp divisions between its large indigenous population, 
mostly ethnically Maya and speaking various Maya languages, and Ladinos, 
Spanish-speaking, non-Indian Guatemalans. The Maya of the Guatemalan 
highlands, conquered by the Spaniards and their indigenous Mexican allies 
by Alvarado and other conquistadores from 1524-1540, continued during 
the colonial period to live in their traditional communities managing their 
communally-owned lands, protected by Spanish colonial law. In independent 
Guatemala, however, a political rhetoric developed during the nineteenth 
century whereby the culture and values of the Maya people became seen 
as antithetical to liberalism and economic progress. Maya groups tended to 
support the conservative dictator Rafael Carrera who defeated the Liberals 
in 1839 and established an authoritarian regime which lasted for twenty-
six years. In 1871 Liberal groups regained control of the new republic and 
embarked on a comprehensive programme of title individualization and 
related changes to labour and revenue law, principally in order to encourage 
foreign investment in the coffee industry. In 1877, the Rufino Barrios 
administration ended the colonial system of rent payments by municipalities 
and at the same time enacted legislation requiring all landowners to prove 
ownership by means of recognized legal titles. According to one historian, 
these steps led to a reduction of Indian communal lands by at least half by 
the early twentieth century. Those who benefited included coffee planters 
or ‘ambitious Ladinos capitalizing on the general ignorance and political 
vulnerability of the Indian’.19 Communal lands have continued to decline 
during the twentieth century, although some Indian municipalities have 
managed to retain their lands to the present day.20 Collective tenures, as I 
understand the position, were not however abolished as such (as they were in 
El Salvador), but certainly liberal regimes were hostile to such tenures and 
took steps to reduce their extent. Land and land tenure issues in Guatemala 
are no less important than in Mexico, but in Guatemala have a different 
twist: in the latter country the real issue is the radically unequal distribution 
of land in the country, which creates significant social problems and imposes 
major pressures on the Maya peoples of the Guatemalan highlands.
 Another Central American country which underwent a similar process 
of tenurial transformation in the nineteenth century was El Salvador, 
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which followed a very similar trajectory to Guatemala.21 In El Salvador, 
today the most densely populated of the Central American republics, the 
main changes took place from 1879-1896, with the same objective of 
expanding the coffee industry. Following pressure from coffee growers, 
who wanted make lands held on collective tenures either by municipalities 
(tierras ejidales) or indigenous communities (tierras comunales), a series 
of laws were passed which began by requiring that collectively held hands 
be measured and surveyed off, then provided that municipalities allocate 
lands to those who wished to grow coffee, and which in 1881 went to the 
length of abolishing collective tenures completely, requiring communities to 
distribute full ownership of lands to those who were engaged in cultivation. 
This process of tenurial change in El Salvador has been analyzed fully by 
the historical geographer David Browning.22 Because Indian communities 
in El Salvador happened to live mostly in areas which were especially 
suitable for coffee growing – unlike Guatemala – one historian has judged 
that ‘the Salvadoran land reform was more harmful and virulent to Indian 
communities than the Guatemalan version’.23 El Salvador also stands out as 
having taken the unusual stance of claiming – until recently – that there 
are no indigenous people left in El Salvador: everyone was supposedly 
mestizo. Who is, and who is not ‘Indian’ (indio) in Central America, and the 
connections between ethnic and national identity are contested terrain – as 
in New Zealand, although New Zealand is a far less edgy place, to put it 
mildly, than Guatemala or El Salvador.24
 As another example, Colombia also set aside and granted formal titles to 
the former indigenous community lands in the nineteenth centuries, a process 
which, as in Mexico, was perceived as a liberal and emancipatory step.25 
In Colombia these areas are known as resguardos (protections, protected 
lands), which, during the Republican period, were ‘properly titled Indian 
lands enjoying a limited amount of political autonomy’.26 However, Colombia 
is as unlike Central America as can be imagined and the political and 
ideological context is very different – it is a country where the nineteenth-
century distinction between Liberals and Conservatives, characteristic of 
nineteenth-century Spain and Mexico as well, has continued unabated into 
modern times and has become entrenched in modern politics. Colombia is 
not unstable but is a country dominated by electoral party politics, but those 
politics are polarized – some would say, have been rendered poisonous – to a 
remarkable degree. It is also known today for having remarkably progressive 
policies with respect to its richly diverse indigenous peoples.
Revivals of collectivism in Mexico and the United States
Latin America may be a region which shares with the United States and New 
Zealand a tradition of hostility to indigenous collective tenures, but it is also 
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a region in which a counter-movement has flourished. This counter-current 
has been especially important in Mexico, but it also echoed strongly in the 
United States in the 1930s and 1940s at a time when New Deal liberals, 
including John Collier and Felix Cohen, dominated the formation of Federal 
Indian policy under Roosevelt. In the Mexico of President Lázaro Cárdenas, 
Manuel Gamio, Diego Rivera and Frida Kahlo this renewed interest in 
indigenous collectivism fused with Marxism, fashionable admiration for 
the USSR, and sympathy for the agrarian programmes of the beleaguered 
Spanish republic.
 To American legal historians, John Collier is a key figure in the history 
of Federal Indian law, the chief architect of the Indian Reorganization Act 
1934 (IRA) and the inspiration for a new era in Indian policy in the 1930s 
and 1940s.27 Wilcomb E. Washburn has written that ‘Collier’s work as 
commissioner of Indian affairs is probably the most impressive achievement 
in the field of applied anthropology that the discipline of anthropology can 
claim’.28 Collier was friendly with the Mexican archaeologist, indigenist and 
secular liberal reformer Manuel Gamio, who had himself received part of his 
training in anthropology in the United States.29 The two worked together on 
the Inter-American Indian Institute, established after a major international 
conference at Pátzuaro, Mexico, in 1940. Collier wrote that ‘[t]his hemisphere 
does not contain a broader-minded man or a spirit more devoted than Manuel 
Gamio’.30 Gamio and Collier were both ‘indigenists’ in the sense that they 
were personally committed to community life and to the values and ethics of 
indigenous peoples as a counterweight to what they perceived as the selfish 
individualism of the modern world. Indians not only had the right to their 
own cultures: those cultures embodied ethical ideas which were valuable in 
their own right. Collier had led the attack on the allotment system originally 
introduced into the reservations by the General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 
1884.31 He founded the American Indian Defense Organization in 1923 and 
always opposed assimilation of the American Indians. In 1933 Roosevelt 
appointed Collier as Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and Collier and his 
officials immediately began work on the legislation enacted as the IRA the 
following year. The IRA was a milestone in American legal history and 
many of today’s Indian governments were established under it.
 Collier openly admired Lázaro Cárdenas, president of Mexico from 1934-
1940 and still today Mexico’s most revered post-revolutionary president.32 
The fact that a prominent United States government official and reformer 
could openly admire and esteem a Mexican radical politician like Cárdenas, 
who nationalized the ownership, production and distribution of petroleum 
and who was responsible for the return of vast areas of government lands 
to the indigenous communes under the ejido system illustrates the liberal 
and idealistic temper of American government under Roosevelt. For reasons 
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that need not be explored here, following World War II United States policy 
entered a period characterized by support of authoritarian regimes in Central 
America and the Caribbean, the battle lines being regrettably hardened by 
events in Guatemala and Cuba in the 1950s. It is not coincidental that, 
within the United States, Federal Indian policy in the early 1950s also 
sharply reversed direction. The Indian New Deal and the work of Collier 
and his senior officials, including Cohen, had always faced congressional 
hostility. Following attacks by Western politicians on alleged favouritism 
to Western Indians as well as personal attacks on Collier himself, Collier 
resigned in 1945 and Indian policy was later placed in the hands of Dillon 
Myer – who had supervised the relocation of Japanese-Americans during 
the War, Collier having been a prominent critic of Myer’s methods. In 1950 
Myer embarked on a controversial policy of termination of tribal status and 
the phase of New Deal idealism in Federal Indian policy came to an end, 
to the great personal disappointment of idealists and intellectuals such as 
Felix Cohen.33
 In the 1930s, both Mexico and the United States pursued a similar anti-
assimilationist path in indigenous policy, a major policy reversal for both 
countries, driven in both countries by progressive ‘indigenist’ officials: 
principally Gamio in Mexico and Collier in the United States. As noted 
above, these two were friends who admired and respected one another. 
Collier always retained a hemispheric sense about indigenist policy, probably 
more than Cohen did. In the United States the main vehicle for new policies 
was the IRA; in Mexico it was the ejido programme. Both had in common 
a rejection of earlier liberal models of individualizing tenures – policies 
pursued in many countries, including New Zealand – and a return to 
automony and collectivist communal tenures. A repudiation of capitalistic 
individualism and a revalorization of communal, if not ‘communist’ tenures, 
places American and Mexican Indian policy of the day well on the left, 
exemplifying a kind of idealistic communalism which has had many 
antecedents in American and English radical history and which was to re-
emerge in the idealistic environment of the new state of Israel after 1948 
with its kibbutz movement.
 None of these heady ideas had any impact in New Zealand, which went 
right on individualizing customary tenures throughout the twentieth century 
until there was no land in Maori customary title left. There are a number 
of possible explanations for this difference, but to me the most obvious is 
that while nineteenth-century New Zealand, settled largely by politicized 
Anglo-Scottish liberals and politically aware rural people from southern 
England, was by no means cut off from the intellectual life of the day, this 
was not the case in the first half of the twentieth century. Twentieth-century 
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developments in such fields as anthropology and jurisprudence passed New 
Zealand by until after the Second World War.
 James Belich has argued that twentieth-century New Zealand in a sense 
re-colonized itself, economically and intellectually, in the twentieth century, 
only escaping from this self-imposed torpor in the 1970s.34 This interpretation 
is borne out by Maori land policy, which remained astonishingly mediocre, 
conservative and unimaginative until the pivotal Maori Lands Amendment 
Act of 1974. This Act was the work of Matiu Rata, who was also 
responsible for the Treaty of Waitangi Act enacted the following year. In 
1929, admittedly, a new era half-dawned to some extent in New Zealand 
when Apirana Ngata became Native Minister and was able to put in place 
a programme of Maori land development financed by the state, but this 
was not accompanied by any formal changes to the tenurial system or any 
attempt to reverse the individualizing tendencies of the Native Lands Acts. 
But in Mexico and the United States things were very different.
Parallels and dissimilarities
Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador and Colombia are thus very different 
countries with quite different political cultures. But all four are alike in 
having witnessed very significant changes in land tenure and land ownership 
in the nineteenth century: the ‘ownership’ and ‘tenurial’ revolutions. And 
this is just as true of New Zealand. What does this reveal?
 This paper is only introductory and my own thinking about the 
relationships between tenure, indigenous peoples, and national political 
ideologies is still evolving. Where exactly this leads is not yet clear to 
me, I have to admit, but some points can be made as a basis for further 
work and reflection. There are certainly some marked similarities between 
land tenure policies in Latin America and New Zealand, and this seems 
interesting and intriguing in itself, or so it seems to me at least. Direct 
influence can probably be ruled out. It is hard to imagine that the Rufino 
Barrios administration in Guatemala or the Científicos of the Porfiriato had 
heard of New Zealand’s Native Land Acts, or that Chief Judge Fenton or 
Sir Donald McLean knew anything about Latin America – except perhaps 
from what they might have gained from reading Prescott’s best-selling 
nineteenth-century histories of the conquests of Mexico and Peru. What 
these parallels indicate, rather, is a common source or set of ideas which 
can only originate in Europe – a belief that land held by the church, or 
held under traditional collective tenures, is in effect ‘dead’ land, useless as 
a security and a brake on economic growth and political advancement. The 
Spanish term used for the process, especially with respect to Church lands, 
is ‘desamortización’, which implies a sense of ‘freeing-up’ or ‘bringing back 
to life’ perhaps.
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 One pivotal key to nineteenth-century Latin American history is 
nineteenth-century Spanish history (just as in the twentieth century the 
political fall-out from the Spanish Civil War was of great importance in Latin 
America). While the agrarian legislation of revolutionary and Napoleonic 
France, which no doubt affected the policies and programmes of Liberals 
in nineteenth-century Spain, must be important, nevertheless this does 
not explain an almost identical approach to land and tenures in Britain, 
Ireland, the United States, Hawai’i – and in New Zealand. French ideas, 
whether revolutionary or Napoleonic, exerted little influence in Britain and 
her colonial offshoots. Britain nevertheless had a tradition of parliamentary 
enclosure, of general enclosure acts, and of legislative abolition of what 
remained of customary tenures in Ireland and the Highlands and Islands 
of Scotland. From this tradition the Native Lands Acts in New Zealand 
may be said to originate. Nonetheless, there is a clear convergence between 
countries as various as the United States, Guatemala and New Zealand 
which obviously derives from a common ideological source shared by all 
the European states and the colonies and former colonies. This remains to 
be rediscovered and understood before the entire evolution of the tenurial 
revolutions of the nineteenth century can be really understood (There may 
also be connections as well with the endless debates over agrarian reform 
in nineteenth-century Russia). A powerful ideology is clearly at work. But 
where did it come from? That is something I would like to find out.
 The second general point is that it seems important to consider not 
only the process and ideology that driving legislative interference with 
ecclesiastical lands and with indigenous customary tenures, but also with 
the details of the process of reallocation. Title individualization leads, 
almost inevitably, to land loss. Who, however, are the beneficiaries, and are 
they the same everywhere? What political and ideological underpinnings 
are there, which impact on the process of alienation? In New Zealand, for 
example, the ideology of ‘close settlement’ – dense rural settlement, the 
‘small man’ on the land – was very important. Even after the process of 
individualization and privatization that I have described, it was the State 
which was the major purchaser of Maori land, by a huge margin. The legal 
framework relating to Maori land tenures was but a part of a much larger 
legal framework relating to public lands, which was hostile to large estates 
and protective of the small settlers. New Zealand is not a country of large 
rural estates and landless rural labourers, but a country of family farms, close 
settlement, and a network of thriving and prosperous country towns. It is a 
country not of rural poverty, like so much of Latin America, but of rural 
wealth – like other parts of Latin America (Uruguay, south-eastern Brazil, 
Argentina, Costa Rica). It seems that the individualization and allotment 
of customary and church lands in Mexico and Guatemala was not to the 
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benefit of small farmers and immigrants, but rather to the benefit of large 
landowners, especially the case in Mexico during the Porfiriato. Mexico 
then reversed these policies following the Revolution of 1910-1920, and 
large estates were broken up and regranted to rural communes, particularly 
during the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas. Clearly then policies relating to 
allocation and distribution of titled and regranted former customary lands 
are pivotal. Allocation is as important as privatization and both must be 
understood before meaningful comparisons can be developed. A comparative 
perspective can particularly help elucidate the differences and similarities 
amongst a group of nineteenth-century countries and strive to grasp the 
varying consequences for wealth, poverty, and social development today.
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